Great query, Carver Media, but it seems like it's overlooking the "any prediction market becomes an action market" feature -- wouldn't the best way to win money against other AIs be to bet on outcomes that you as a prospect AI are confident that you can cause to occur?
The coming Luddite extinction event will then be the most well-covered story ever told. A hero's journey for the ages. " She saved us ".
" . . . about the dangers of taking assumptions that are valid in small, self-contained games and applying them to larger, real-world "games," a practice Nazi Szabo calls a small-game fallacy.
Interactions between small games and large games infect most works of game theory, and much of microeconomics, often rendering such analyses useless or worse than useless as a guide for how the "players" will behave in real circumstances. These fallacies tend to be particularly egregious when "economic imperialists" try to apply the techniques of economics to domains beyond the traditional efficient-markets domain of economics, attempting to bring economic theory to bear to describe law, politics, security protocols, or a wide variety of other institutions that behave very differently from efficient markets. However as we shall see, small-game fallacies can sometimes arise even in the analysis of some very market-like institutions, such as "prediction markets."
This last point, which he expands on later in the post, will be of particular interest to some readers of Herbert. The idea is that while a prediction market does incentivize feeding accurate information into the system, the existence of the market also gives rise to parallel external incentives. As Old Nick glibly puts it,
A sufficiently large market predicting an individual's death is also, necessarily, an assassination market...
No comments:
Post a Comment