the idea that fees alone stop spam sounds good on paper, but breaks down fast when you look at real attacks.
fees swing around. on a quiet sunday morning, an attacker can jam blocks with junk for pennies. by the time fees rise, the junk is already locked in and every node has to store it forever.
not every attacker cares about burning money. governments (especially governments who want bitcoin to die) ideological actors, rival coins, or just rich trolls can spam even when fees are high. think about that for a second and you’ll realize that this action immediately invites some actors/bodies to throw unlimited resources at trying to kill bitcoin. economic deterrence only works on people with limited resources who care about economics.
spammers pay miners, but the cost lands on everyone else. every node has to download, process, and store spam transactions forever.
the bitcoin blockchain itself remained neutral 'til now, it's simply a ledger of txs. the problematic content emerges only when specialized software interprets blockchain data in ways that reconstruct harmful material. until now, the defense was that bitcoin doesnt support data, it requires extra tools and software to transform it to CSAM. however, with the introduction of core 30, this distinction becomes less tenable. 30 effectively transforms every participating node into a component of a distributed storage system making operators potentially complicit in hosting content rather than merely maintaining tx records. this shift fundamentally changes the nature of node operation from passive record-keeping to active data hosting, raising new questions about liability and responsibility for network participants. another words every node running core 30 effectively becomes part of the data-storage layer and thats a big problem!
if bitcoin is money and if you’re a monetary maximalist, there’s no such thing as “legitimate or interesting content” on the network beyond tx data.
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